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positive price. Therefore, the Principle of Minimum Product Di¤erentiation
holds even for linear transportation costs.
Proposition 5: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ects, even if consumers face linear transportation costs, there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium in which rms locate in the center of the in-
terval setting positive prices:
1) p1 = p2 = [t  Cext(N)],
2) x1 = x2 = 12 .
2 Conclusion
We have investigated price competition in the Hotelling location model with
linear transportation costs when consumer preferences are a¤ected by the num-
ber of consumers shopping at the same store. The introduction of a quadratic
and concave consumption externality permits to consider at the same time,
and not alternatively, both the imitation and the congestion e¤ects which are
opposite forces at work.
Some signicant even if predictable results are been reached. While compe-
tition is relaxed when consumers have an appreciable degree of sensitivity to
congestion e¤ects, a ercer price competition results when preferences are ap-
preciably a¤ected from imitative behaviors. The sensibility of consumer pref-
erences to the two opposite network e¤ects also have signicant impacts on
the market share of the stores in cases of positional advantages. The market
share of the store with positional advantage increases either when the imita-
tion e¤ect becomes more signicant and when the congestion e¤ect becomes
less important. Even if our approach is partial -perhaps not too general- in
many aspects, it resolves the non-existence problem of the Hotelling model.
Our model shows that positive equilibrium prices exist for any symmetric and
asymmetric location. Moreover, even if the stores were located at the same
point, the usual Bertrand argument should not lead to the competitive out-
come. Furthermore given the possibility for rms to set the best locations, we
confer new validity to the principle of minimum product di¤erentiation when
consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and congestion e¤ects.
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